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Developing an Analysis of Threats to Voting SystemsOctober 7, 2005   Gaithersburg, MDNIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology

 

 

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Ballot Marking Devices (BMD)


A Ballot Marking Device (BMD) based system is typically an accessible computer-based voting system that produces a marked ballot (usually paper) that is the result of voter interaction with visual or audio prompts. The result is a voter-verified ballot that may or may not be accessibly verified. Some BMDs count votes internally (as do DRE systems) and may save voter selection information. For any BMD that does count, save or use cryptography or other techniques to make it difficult to insert, before, during or after actual polling, fraudulent ballots prepared on other devices, any discrepancy between records stored within a BMD and physical ballots produced would provide clear evidence of malfunction or fraud and initiate an investigation to determine the source of the discrepancy and the invalid ballots, whether electronic or physical.

Scenario assumptions for BMD systems:

1. Purchase and handling of Ballots before Election Day

• Paper ballot is human-readable and machine-readable.
• Voters are provided with sample ballots in advance where layout of the ballot is identical to one they will be voting on.

2. Set-up for Election Day

• Fresh cartridge put in machine
• Document recording cartridge and machine pairings and total number of recording cartridges.
• Range of ballot serial numbers from sealed box(es) is recorded.
• Number of boxes (i.e. total number of blank ballot papers) is recorded.
• Paper/material of ballots is validated (paper quality, inks, etc.)
• Ensure no one at polling station can read ballot identifiers.

3. Operation during Election Day

• Each voter receives a “voting authority” to submit one paper ballot marked electronically via BMD on tamper evident paper.
• Each voter is briefly instructed on operation of machines and what the paper ballot means.
• Record stored in ballot-marking device (BMD) and retained as paper ballots. Paper ballots then scanned into machines at the polling place. Paper ballot is the official legal record.
• Each voter is encouraged to verify the paper ballot.
• Each voter is encouraged to verify validity of ballot material (paper quality, inks, etc.)
• Voter watches his/her own ballot being scanned into machine.
• Spoiled paper ballots are voided by poll workers and saved in separate container.

4. Close of Election Day

• Two final tapes from each machine printed, total votes tallied at polling station.
• One set of additional tapes for each poll worker printed.
• Cartridges with ballot images from each machine are collected. Cartridge/machine pairings and total number of cartridges are verified.
• Voter entries and exits in the poll book(s) are counted. Number of voters recorded reconciled with total of votes on all machine tallies.
• Ballot box is opened and the number of paper counted. Total number of paper ballots reconciled with tally from paper tapes and poll books.
• All blank and spoiled ballots accounted for.
• Poll workers sign all but one set of paper tallies.
• .
• Having made reports, seal records from polling station in envelope signed by all poll workers. Records include machine cartridges, unsigned machine tapes (zero and final), poll books, hand-written forms containing reconciliations, provisional ballots sealed in a separate envelope and counted separately
• Blank ballots are sealed back in boxes.
• Signed and sealed packages are hand-delivered by some group of election workers. Ideally the group should contain members from each contesting party. In any case, the group must contain at least two workers from distinct parties. Delivering and receiving election officials log receipt of package at headquarters.

5. Post Election Day Audit

• Statistical sampling as part of an Automatic Routine Audit (ARA). Automatic audit consists of randomly selecting both ballot-marking and scanning machines.


View a document describing scenario assumptions for other voting device types.

View an all-in-one document describing the four primary voting device types.

Other voting device types:

 

Page created August 2005
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